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Abstract. Formal principles governing best practices in classification and 
definition have for too long been neglected in the construction of biomedical 
ontologies, in ways which have important negative consequences for data 
integration and ontology alignment. We argue that the use of such principles in 
ontology construction can serve as a valuable tool in error-detection and also in 
supporting reliable manual curation. We argue also that such principles are a 
prerequisite for the successful application of advanced data integration 
techniques such as ontology-based multi-database querying, automated ontology 
alignment and ontology-based text-mining. These theses are illustrated by 
means of a case study of the Gene Ontology, a project of increasing importance 
within the field of biomedical data integration. 
1 Introduction 
In order to integrate databases, one has to overcome problems at several levels. These 
include legal problems related to access and redistribution, technical problems related 
to the employment of heterogeneous storage and access methods and query 
languages, and housekeeping problems relating to the management of corrections and 
updates. Here we are concerned with what are loosely called semantic obstacles to 
database integration [1], problems which manifest themselves both at the database 
schema level and at the level of data entry [2]. In simple terms, database systems 
should use language consistently, which means: they should use the same terms to 
refer to the same things. Semantic heterogeneities at the schema level arise where 
different names are used for equivalent database fields and tables. Systems to 
overcome schema level semantic heterogeneities are introduced in [3-8]. Semantic 
heterogeneities arise at the entry level where different terms are used for the same 
things, or the same terms are used for different things.  
Ontologies have thus far played a role in the semantic integration of databases at 
the entry level by providing controlled vocabularies which have the goal of making it 
possible to search different databases secure in the knowledge that the same terms, 
wherever they are encountered, will always represent the same entities. One of the 
most impressive and influential developments in this respect is the Gene Ontology 
(GO) [9], which plays a central role in attempts to develop controlled vocabularies for 
shared use across different biological domains. The tremendous investment of time 
and effort by the GO Consortium has already brought considerable benefits to a range 
of different types of biological and biomedical research. 
GO’s December 2003 release contains some 16,658 terms divided into three 
networks whose topmost nodes are, respectively: cellular component, molecular 
function and biological process. In contradistinction to much existing usage, we shall 
refer to the nodes in such hierarchies not as concepts but rather on the one hand as 
terms (where we are interested in the hierarchies themselves, as syntactic structures), 
and on the other hand as classes (where we are interested in the biological entities to 
which these terms refer). It is classes, not concepts, which stand in is a and part of 
relations [10]. They do this in virtue of specific kinds of relations between the 
individual entities which instantiate these classes [10].  
GO’s three networks are structured by the relations of subsumption (is a) and of 
partonomic inclusion (part of). Crucially, GO treats its three structured networks as 
separate ontologies, which means that no ontological relations are defined between 
them. Thus for example GO does not record the fact that a given function is the 
function of a given component, or that a given process is the exercise of a given 
function. One reason for this is that the molecular functions and biological processes 
are standardly exercised by entities instantiating classes which fall outside the scope 
of GO. GO has an ontology of cellular components, not however of molecular 
structures or (with some few exceptions, such as host [GO:0018995]) of organism-
level structures. Thus GO includes behavior [GO:0007610] and adult behavior 
[GO:0030534], defined as ‘Behavior in a fully developed and mature organism’, 
within its biological process hierarchies, but it has no room for adult or organism.  
The decision of the GO Consortium to develop its three separate ontologies in this 
way has brought a variety of benefits, and we do not here recommend its 
abandonment. What we do recommend is that, in the process of constructing GO and 
of similar biomedical information resources in the future, special attention be paid to 
the problems which inevitably arise where standard rules of good classification are 
not respected – rules which have been tested in ontology research and in associated 
formal disciplines since the time of Aristotle and some examples of which are 
outlined below.  
In the case of GO, these problems manifest themselves in characteristic shortfalls 
in formal integrity, turning on uncertainty as to the relations between the classes in 
GO’s three ontologies. For example, there is no linkage between the term taste 
[GO:0007607], which is a biological process term, and the term taste receptor activity 
[GO:0008527], which is a molecular function term. This has an adverse impact on 
data integration when GO’s data structure is used to retrieve or link related 
information from different data sources [11]. 
As we shall see, GO’s three ontologies are not primarily used to support 
automated reasoning, but rather as a means by which biologists can easily and rapidly 
locate existing terms and relations within a structured vocabulary and so determine 
the proper treatment of new terms when the latter present themselves as candidates for 
incorporation in biomedical databases. To this end, GO has been highly successful in 
providing a controlled vocabulary that is used by different research groups in 
annotating genes and gene products. If, however, GO is to reap its full potential in 
supporting data integration across the life sciences, then shortfalls from formal 
integrity of the sorts here isolated become important. Here we shall focus on isolating 
such shortfalls and on suggestions as how they might be avoided in the future. Such 
avoidance is, we shall argue, a prerequisite for the use of GO in conjunction with 
tools for advanced data integration of a sort which meet the standards of 
contemporary biomedical informatics, including tools for alignment of ontologies [12, 
13], ontology based text-mining [14-16] and ‘intelligent’ multi-database querying.  
GO has often been criticized for its inconsistencies and for its lack of clear 
guidance as to what the relations between its three ontologies are. However, the 
literature thus far has not provided practical solutions to these problems in terms of 
general rules as to how they can be avoided in the future. Such problems cannot 
generally be overcome in an automated way. Rather, they require that the process of 
design and manual curation follow the general rules of classification which are 
familiar from the literature of logic and philosophy. Certainly biologists can avoid 
some inconsistencies via the use of ontology editing tools such as Protégé-2000, 
which support some automated consistency checking. However, by using Protégé-
2000 the authors of [17] were able to identify only some minor inconsistencies in GO. 
It is, however, possible to take advantage of the fact that the Gene Ontology, like 
most of the controlled vocabularies united under the Open Biological Ontologies 
(OBO) umbrella, is maintained using the relatively user-friendly tool DAG-Edit [13]. 
One message of what follows is that one step towards greater formal coherence can be 
achieved by building sound policy into DAG-Edit and similar tools in ways which 
ensure the avoidance of certain kinds of errors, and we are pleased to see that OBO 
(http://obo.sourceforge.net/list.shtml) has defined relationships in development.  
2 Problems with Part of 
GO seeks to establish a ‘controlled vocabulary’. This means that it accepts the rule of 
univocity: terms should have the same meanings (and thus point to the same referents) 
on every occasion of use. Unfortunately GO breaks this rule already in its treatment of 
the part of  relation, which is at the very center of its hierarchical organization and 
with which at least three different meanings are associated [18]: 
 
P1. A part of B means: A is sometimes part of B in the sense that there is for each 
instance of A some time at which it is part of an instance of B (in the standard 
mereological sense of ‘part’ as a relation between particulars). Example: replication 
fork (is at some times during the cell cycle) part of nucleoplasm. 
 
P2. A part of B means: A can be part of B in the sense of a time-independent inclusion 
relation between classes, which we can summarize as: class A is part of class B if and 
only if there is some sub-class C of B which is such that all instances of A are in-
cluded as parts in instances of C and all instances of C have parts which are instances 
of A. Example: flagellum part of cell (some types of cells have flagella as parts). 
 
P3. A part of B means: vocabulary A is included within vocabulary B. Example: 
cellular component ontology part of gene ontology. 
 
GO’s ‘part of ’ violates not only univocity but also two other rules at the heart of good 
practice in the establishment of a formally rigorous framework of definitions: a term 
with an established use (inside and outside biomedical ontology) is used with a new, 
non-standard use; a lexically simple term is used to represent a lexically complex 
concept that is standardly expressed by means of phrases including the lexically 
simple term as part. To define ‘part of’ as meaning ‘can be part of’ is rather like 
defining ‘sulphur’ as meaning ‘organo-sulphur compound.’ 
 Solution: At present, DAG-Edit is shipped with only one built-in relation type, 
namely ‘is a’, and even the latter can be deleted by the user at will. By including a 
fixed set of well-defined relation types that cannot be removed or modified by the 
user, biologists using DAG-Edit would become aware of the different relation types at 
their disposal. Whenever a user employs a relation type such as ‘part of ’, a menu 
should pop up which offers a list of alternative more specific relation types, such as is 
localized in or is involved in. This would go far towards solving the problems which 
currently arise when OBO ontologies built with DAG-Edit use different names and 
identifiers for the same relation types and associate different relation types with the 
same names and identifiers. 
3 Problems with Is a 
GO’s three term hierarchies have some obvious relation to the species and genera of 
more traditional biology When we evaluate GO as a classification of biological 
phenomena, however, then we discover that GO often uses is a, too, in ways which 
violate univocity. This is in part because GO is confined to the two relations is a and 
part of and because it does not allow ontological relations between its three separate 
ontologies. Thus it is constrained to place too great a load on is a than this relation is 
capable of bearing.  
 Thus when GO postulates:  
 
[1] cell differentiation is a cellular process 
 
[2] cell differentiation is a development, 
 
then it means two different things by ‘is a’, and only in the former case do we have to 
deal with a true subsumption relation between biological classes. That there is a 
problem with the latter case can be seen by noting that, where the agent or subject of 
differentiation is the cell, the agent or subject of development is the whole organism. 
That one process or function class subsumes another process or function class, 
implies, however, that same subject or agent is involved in each. This implies, 
however, that the definition: 
 
 GO:0007275 Development  
Definition: Biological processes specifically aimed at the progression of an 
organism over time from an initial condition (e.g. a zygote, or a young adult) to 
a later condition (e.g. a multicellular animal or an aged adult) 
  
should be modified by deleting the italicized portion, and that the relation in [2] 
should then more properly be expressed as: contributes to. Or alternatively, some way 
must be found to ensure that ‘development’ is used consistently in all its occurrences 
in GO, to refer either always to processes whose bearers are the whole organism, or to 
processes whose bearers may be individual cells, organs, or other organism 
constituents. 
 Another example of uncertainty regarding GO’s is a relation is illustrated by:  
 
[3] hexose biosynthesis is a monosaccharide biosynthesis 
 
[4] hexose biosynthesis is a hexose metabolism, 
 
Here the second is a seems more properly to amount to a part of relation, since hexose 
biosynthesis is just that part of hexose metabolism in which hexose is synthesized. 
GO postulates: 
 
[5] vacuole (sensu Fungi) is a storage vacuole 
 
[6] vacuole (sensu Fungi) is a lytic vacuole, 
 
where ‘sensu’ is the operator introduced by GO ‘to cope with those cases where a 
word or phrase has different meanings when applied to different organisms,’ 
(http://www.geneontology.org/doc/GO.usage.html#sensu). 
 Lytic vacuole is defined by GO as meaning: a vacuole that is maintained at an 
acidic pH and which contains degradative enzymes, including a wide variety of acid 
hydrolases. Inspection now reveals that ‘is a’, here, stands in neither case for a 
genuine subsumption relation between biological classes. Rather, it signifies on the 
one hand the assignment of a function or role, and on the other hand the assignment of 
special features to the entities in question. Certainly there are, in some sense of the 
term ‘class’, classes of storage vacuoles and of lytic vacuoles; and certainly it is the 
case that all instances of vacuole (sensu Fungi) are instances of storage vacuole and 
of lytic vacuole. But that such relations obtain is not as yet sufficient for the existence 
of a genuine is a relation. A box used for storage is not (ipso facto) a special kind of 
box; rather it is a box which plays a special role in certain contexts. And similarly 
‘animal belonging to the emperor’ does not designate a special kind of animal. 
 In Figure 1, 
 
  GO:0000327: lytic vacuole within protein storage vacuole 
 
is recorded as standing in an is a relation to protein storage vacuole. In fact, however, 
we have to deal here with one of several ways in which GO expresses relations of 
location.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Treatment of Vacuole in GO 
(taken from the QuickGO browser: http://www.ebi.ac.uk/ego) 
 
 
Another such example is GO’s term ‘unlocalized,’ which is, and was always intended 
to be, a temporary term, but the consideration of which is nonetheless illuminating: 
 
GO:0005941: unlocalized 
Definition: Used as a holding place for cellular components whose precise 
localization is, as yet, unknown, or has not been determined by GO (the latter 
is the major reason for nodes to have this parent); this term should not be 
used for annotation of gene products, 
 
is used for example in statements such as: 
  
[7] Holliday junction helicase complex is a unlocalized 
 
[8] Unlocalized is a cellular component 
 
[7] and [8] illustrate GO’s shortfall from two further principles: 
 
positivity: complements of classes are not themselves classes. (Terms such as 
‘non-mammal’ or ‘non-membrane’ do not designate natural kinds.) 
 
objectivity: which classes exist is not a function of the current state of our 
biological knowledge. (Terms incorporating expressions such as ‘unclassified’ 
or ‘with unknown ligand’ do not designate biological natural kinds.) 
 
Shortfalls from positivity are illustrated also by terms like ‘non-muscle myosin’; 
shortfalls from objectivity by terms like ‘G-protein coupled receptor activity, 
unknown ligand.’ 
 Another rule of good classification familiar from the logico-philosophical 
literature is:  
 
levels: the terms in a classificatory hierarchy should be divided into pre-
determined levels (analogous to the levels of kingdom, phylum, class, order, 
etc., in traditional biology).  
 
(Similarly, terms in a partonomic hierarchy should be divided into predetermined 
granularity levels, for example: organism, organ, cell, molecule, etc. GO’s distinction 
between biological processes, cellular components and molecular functions/activities 
reflects this partonomic principle of levels, and GO currently contemplates a move to 
distinguish ‘cell physiological process’ and ‘organism physiological process’ in this 
same spirit.) 
 Theorists of classification have recognized further that the terms on each such 
level should ideally satisfy the rules: 
 
single inheritance: no class in a classificatory hierarchy should have more than 
one parent on the immediate higher level 
 
exhaustiveness: the classes on any given level should exhaust the domain of 
the classificatory hierarchy 
 
These two rules together constitute the so-called JEPD (for: jointly exhaustive and 
pairwise disjoint) criterion. Exhaustiveness is of course often difficult to satisfy in the 
realm of biological phenomena. Shortfalls from single inheritance are however easy 
to detect, and their acceptance thus amounts to the rejection of the JEPD ideal.  
The acceptance of the latter in traditional classifications is no accident. 
Exhaustiveness is a clear positive trait for a classificatory hierarchy; its acceptance in 
some form is presupposed as a goal by every biological scientist. Single inheritance 
reflects the presumption that if a term in a classificatory hierarchy has two is a 
parents, then the hierarchy needs to be refined [19]. Nowadays, however, single 
inheritance is less commonly accepted as a positive trait because multiple inheritance 
is so useful a device in facilitating compactness and efficient maintenance of large-
scale ontologies. This is because it allows one to make large changes to a portion of 
an ontology without the need to adjust each individual lower-level element. It also 
allows one to avoid certain kinds of combinatory explosion. On the other hand, as will 
become clear from many of the examples treated in this paper, shortfalls from single 
inheritance are often clues to bad coding. This is because such shortfalls mark often 
subtle deviations from a reading of ‘is a’ as standing for a genuine class subsumption 
relation. Such deviations are difficult to communicate to curators in terms of generally 
intelligible principles. But more importantly, they also serve as obstacles too ontology 
integration, since they amount to the conscious adoption of a policy according to 
which ‘is a’ means different things in different contexts. [11] 
We here leave open the question whether division into levels and single 
inheritance involving genuine is a relations can be achieved throughout the realm of 
classifications treated of by GO. We note only that, as Guarino and Welty [19] have 
shown, methods exist for systematically removing cases of multiple inheritance from 
class hierarchies by distinguishing is a relations from ontological relations of other 
sorts. Using these methods, well-structured classifications can be achieved by 
recognizing additional relations (for example: has role, is dependent on, is involved 
in, contributes to, is located in) and by allowing categories of entities of different 
sorts (for instance sites, constituents, roles, functions, qualities) within a single 
ontology. GO, however, does not have these alternatives at its disposal, not least 
because of its insistence that its three constituent vocabularies represent separate 
ontologies with no relations defined between them. At the same time, however, we 
will still need to find ways to represent in a formally coherent way those cases, such 
as storage vacuole or immunological synapse, where role and bearer together are 
referred to as forming a single entity. 
4 Problems with Definitions 
Like other biomedical ontologies, GO provides not only controlled vocabularies with 
hierarchical structures but also definitions of its terms. Indeed part of the goal of GO 
is to provide a source of strict definitions that can be communicated across people and 
applications. The definitions actually supplied by the GO Consortium, however, are 
affected by a number of characteristic problems which, while perhaps not affecting 
their usability by human biologists, raise severe obstacles at the point where the sort 
of formal rigor needed by computer applications is an issue, to the degree that much 
of the information content contained in GO’s definitions is not accessible to software.  
 A well-structured definition should satisfy at least the rule: 
 
intelligibility: the terms used in a definition should be simpler (more 
intelligible, more logically or ontologically basic) than the term to be defined 
   
– for otherwise the definition would provide no assistance to the understanding, and 
thus make no contribution to the GO Consortium’s goal of formulating definitions 
which are usable by human beings.  
That GO does not respect this rule is illustrated for example by:  
 
GO:0007512: adult heart development  
Definition: Generation and development of the heart of a fully developed and 
mature organism 
 
GO:0017145: stem cell renewal  
Definition: The self-renewing division of a stem cell. A stem cell is an 
undifferentiated cell, in the embryo or adult, that can undergo unlimited 
division and give rise to one or several different cell types. 
 
Illustrates two features of GO’s shortfall from standards of good practice in the 
formulation of its definitions: 1. the failure to draw a clear line between providing 
definitions of terms and communicating extra knowledge, 2. the inclusion within the 
definition of a GO of the definition of some second term, that is not present in GO. 
The solution to the latter problem is to provide a supplementary list of all non-GO 
terms treated in this fashion, together with their definitions. It would then be an 
interesting exercise to see what sort of ontology the terms included in this list would 
define. 
Once again, the failure to follow a basic rule of classification and definition is a 
good clue as to the presence of coding errors. Thus consider: 
 
GO:0016326: kinesin motor activity 
Definition: The hydrolysis of ATP (and GTP) that drives the microtubular 
motor along microtubules, 
 
The problem here is that hydrolysis is merely that which provides the energy for 
motor activity and not this activity as a whole. (Note that this term has been declared 
obsolete by GO, not however because it represents an error, but because it represents 
a gene product, and the latter do not fall within the scope of GO.) 
 
 GO:0008527: taste receptor activity  
Definition: Combining with soluble compounds to initiate a change in cell 
activity. These receptors are responsible for the sense of taste.   
 
fails to satisfy a further standard principle of good practice in definition, namely that 
of  
 
substitutivity: in all so-called extensional contexts a defined term must be 
substitutable by its definition in such a way that the result is both 
grammatically correct and has the same truth-value as the sentence with which 
we begin.  
  
(where an ‘extensional context’ is a context not within the scope of mental verb 
phrases such as ‘I believe that’, ‘She denies that’, ‘He knows that’). Adhering to the 
rule of substitutivity ensures inter alia that definitions have the same grammatical 
form as the terms defined. Failures to adhere to this rule are particularly egregious in 
connection with GO’s molecular function hierarchy. 
 It is not possible, on pain of infinite regress, to define every term in accordance 
with the principle of intelligibility. Rather, some terms must be left undefined. 
Definitions should more generally satisfy the rule of modularity, which means that 
they should be organized into levels, with level 0 terms being picked out as undefined 
primitives and terms on levels n + 1, for each n ≥ 0 being defined by appeal 
exclusively to logical and ontological constants (such as ‘and’, ‘all’, ‘is a’ and ‘part 
of ’) together with already defined terms taken from levels ≤ n. Modular definitions 
are especially useful for the purposes of automatic reasoning.  
 Because the rules of univocity, modularity and substitutivity are not satisfied by 
GO’s system of definitions, this means that substitution of the GO definitions for the 
corresponding defined terms appearing within other contexts can be achieved, at best, 
only with human intervention. A valuable source of automatic error-checking and of 
location of classificatory gaps is hereby sacrificed.  
 Consider the example: 
 
GO:0003673: cell fate commitment 
Definition: The commitment of cells to specific cell fates and their capacity to 
differentiate into particular kinds of cells. 
 
The coarse logic of this definition is as follows: 
 
x is a cell fate commitment =def  x is a cell fate commitment and p, 
 
where p is, logically speaking, a second, extraneous condition. Here GO errs by 
providing in its definition at the same time too much and too little information, and 
the user does not know how to interpret the relation of the two clauses in the 
definition. (The first clause is marked, in addition, by the problem of circularity.) 
 If the rule of modularity is satisfied, then this means that in the case of compound 
terms the corresponding definitions should themselves be capable of being generated 
automatically. Thus for example the definition of ‘garland cell differentiation’ should 
be obtainable by taking the definition of ‘cell differentiation’ and substituting ‘garland 
cell’ for ‘cell’ throughout. What we find, however, is: 
 
GO:0030154: cell differentiation 
Definition: The process whereby relatively unspecialized cells, e.g. embryonic 
or regenerative cells, acquire specialized structural and/or functional features 
that characterize the cells, tissues, or organs of the mature organism or some 
other relatively stable phase of the organism’s life history. 
 
GO:0007514: garland cell differentiation 
Definition: Development of garland cells, a small group of nephrocytes which 
take up waste materials from the hemolymph by endocytosis.  
 
This leaves the user in a position where he does not know whether ‘differentiation’ as 
it occurs in the two contexts does or does not mean the same thing. GO’s definition of 
‘garland cell differentiation’ is marked further by the problem that it is in fact a 
definition of garland cell development, of which garland cell differentiation would in 
fact (given the definition of development provided earlier) be a proper subclass. 
 Solution: methods exist which can be used to control definitions for conformity 
with modularity, for example by highlighting words that occur in a definition even 
though they are located deeper in the is a hierarchy. Potential problems of circularity 
can also be indicated by highlighting non-logical words that occur in both a term and 
its definition. Compound terms can be recognized, and automatically generated 
definitions can be suggested to the user in terms of already existing definitions of the 
component parts.  
5 Problems with ‘Sensu’ 
A related set of problems can be illustrated by examining GO’s use of its ‘sensu’ 
operator, which is introduced to cope with those cases where a word or phrase has 
different meanings when applied to different organisms, as for example in the case of 
cell wall. (Cell walls for example in bacteria and fungi have a completely different 
composition.) ‘Using the sensu reference makes the node available to other species 
that use the same process/function/component’ (http://www.geneontology.org/doc-
/GO.usage.html#sensu). If, however, ‘sensu’ is designed to indicate that the modified 
term refers to a different class from that to which the unmodified term refers, then in 
what sense are we still dealing with ‘the same process/function/component’?  
 Since the primary goal of the GO Consortium is to provide an ontology of gene 
products applying to all species, sensu terms are intended to be used sparingly. In 
consequence, sensu terms, as in the case illustrated in Figure 2, are allowed to have 
non-sensu terms as children, as in  
 
[9] R7 differentiation is a eye photoreceptor differentiation (sensu 
Drosophilia).  
 
For again, there is R7 differentiation in species other than Drosophilia, for example in 
crustaceans [20]. 
Another problematic example, which also illustrates once more GO’s multiple 
ways of handling the relation of localization, is GO’s postulation of: 
 
[10] bud tip is a site of polarized growth (sensu Saccharomyces)  
 
from which we can infer that: 
 
[11] every instance of bud tip has an instance of Saccaromyces polarized 
growth located therein.  
 
But GO also has:  
 
[12] site of polarized growth (sensu Saccharomyces) is a site of polarized 
growth (sensu Fungi) 
 
from which we can infer that:  
 
[13] bud tip is a site of polarized growth (sensu Fungi)  
 
and from there to:  
 
[14] every instance of bud tip has an instance of Fungus polarized 
growth located therein. 
 
[11] is consistent with [14] only if either (a) every instance of non-Saccharomyces 
Fungus polarized growth is co-localized with an instance of Saccharomyces polarized 
group or (b) there is Fungus polarized growth only in Saccharomyces. (a) we take to 
be biologically false; but (b) implies that ‘site of polarized growth (sensu 
Saccharomyces)’ and ‘site of polarized growth (sensu Fungi)’ in fact refer, 
confusingly, to the same class, and thus that the latter should be removed from GO’s 
cellular component ontology. 
A further problem is caused by GO’s use of ‘sensu Invertebrata’. Whereas 
vertebrate is a well-defined biological taxon, biologists tend to disagree on what the 
definition of invertebrate should be, and thus apply the ‘sensu Invertebrata’ modifier 
to different taxa. The resultant errors are illustrated for example in the genes 
annotated to  
 
GO:0006960 : antimicrobial humoral response (sensu Invertebrata) 
 
in the browser AMIGO, many of which are not invertebrate genes but rather human 
genes (for example COPE HUMAN, PTGE HUMAN, PTE1 HUMAN, and so on). It 
is surely obvious that a gene with suffix ‘HUMAN’ should not be annotated to a 
biological process which is assigned to invertebrates. 
Solution: These and other problems can be overcome by introducing ‘sensu’ as a 
relational expression with a well-defined meaning that references a systematic species 
nomenclature such as the TAXON database [21]. We understand that GO is 
contemplating taking steps along these lines. In addition measures can be taken to 
check automatically that all GO terms that occur in a given branch of an ‘is a’ 
hierarchy use the same taxon. The problem with ‘Invertebrata’ is also overcome, in 
virtue of the fact that no standard systematic species nomenclature contains this term. 
7 Problems with ‘Function’ 
Recall GO’s definition of ‘toxin activity’ as: ‘Acts as to cause injury to other living 
organisms.’ The problem here flows from GO’s unstable view of how the classes in 
molecular function ontology should precisely be designated [22]. The same problem 
makes itself manifest also in cases such as: 
 
GO:0005199: structural constituent of cell wall  
Definition: The action of a molecule that contributes to the structural integrity 
of a cell wall, 
 
where the definition confuses constituents (which ought properly to be included in 
GO’s constituent ontology) with activities, which GO includes in its function 
ontology. Many other constituents are similarly defined as activities: 
 
extracellular matrix structural constituent 
puparial glue (sensu Diptera)  
structural constituent of bone 
structural constituent of chorion (sensu Insecta)  
structural constituent of chromatin  
structural constituent of cuticle 
structural constituent of cytoskeleton  
structural constituent of epidermis 
structural constituent of eye lens  
structural constituent of muscle  
structural constituent of myelin sheath  
structural constituent of nuclear pore  
structural constituent of peritrophic membrane (sensu Insecta)  
structural constituent of ribosome  
structural constituent of tooth enamel  
structural constituent of vitelline membrane (sensu Insecta) 
8 An Alternative Regime of Definitions 
As a brief illustration of a regime of definitions built up in such a way as to satisfy the 
principles listed above, we consider the Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA), 
which is being developed at the University of Washington, Seattle as part of the 
Digital Anatomist Project. The term hierarchy of the FMA consists in a symbolic 
representation of the structural organization of the human body from the 
macromolecular to the macroscopic levels, with the goal of providing a robust and 
consistent scheme for classifying anatomical entities which can serve as a reference 
ontology in biomedical informatics [23]. 
FMA seeks to follow the formal rules for definitions laid down by Aristotle. A 
definition, on this account, is the specification of the essence (nature, invariant 
structure) shared by all the members of a class or natural kind. Definitions are 
specified by working through a classificatory hierarchy from the top down, with the 
relevant topmost node or nodes acting in every case as undefinable primitives. The 
definition of a class lower down in the hierarchy is then provided by specifying the 
parent of the class (which in a regime conforming to single inheritance is of course in 
every case unique) together with the relevant differentia, which tells us what marks 
out instances of the defined class or species within the wider parent class or genus, as 
in: human = rational animal, where rational is the differentia. An Aristotelian 
definition then satisfies the condition that an entity satisfies the defining condition if 
and only if it instantiates the corresponding class.  
Thus definitions in FMA look like this: 
 
Cell is a anatomical structure that consists of cytoplasm surrounded by a 
plasma membrane with or without a cell nucleus 
 
Plasma membrane is a cell part that surrounds the cytoplasm, 
 
where terms picked out in bold are nodes within the FMA classification and italicized 
terms signify the formal-ontological relations – including is a – which obtain between 
the corresponding classes.  
 As the FMA points out, ontologies ‘differ from dictionaries in both their nature 
and purpose’ [24]. Dictionaries are prepared for human beings; their merely nominal 
definitions can employ the unregimented resources of natural language, can tolerate 
circularities and all manner of idiosyncrasy. In ontologies designed to be usable by 
computers, however, definitions must be formally regimented to a much higher 
degree. The specific type of regimentation chosen by the FMA has the advantage that 
each definition reflects the position in the hierarchy to which a defined term belongs. 
Indeed the position of a term within the hierarchy enriches its own definition by 
incorporating automatically the definitions of all the terms above it. The resultant 
system of definitions brings the benefit that the entire information content of the 
FMA’s term hierarchy can be translated very cleanly into a computer representation, 
and brings also further benefits in terms of reliable curation, efficient error checking 
and information retrieval, and ease of alignment with neighboring ontologies. The 
FMA defines an ontology as a ‘true inheritance hierarchy’ and it thereby draws 
attention to the fact that one central reason for adopting the method of ontologies in 
supporting reasoning across large bodies of data is precisely the fact that this method 
allows the exploitation of the inheritance of properties along paths of is a relations. 
FMA’s regime of definitions – unlike that of GO – gives due merit to this principle. 
9 Conclusion 
We are not proposing here that GO abandon all its current practices in structuring its 
ontologies and accompanying definitions. The world of biomedical research is clearly 
not concerned with all of those sorts of scrupulousness that are important in more 
formal disciplines. Rather, it is a world of difficult trade-offs, in which the benefits of 
formal (logical and ontological) rigor need to be balanced on the one hand against the 
constraints of computer tractability, and on the other hand against the needs of 
practicing biologists. All the formal rules presented above should therefore be 
conceived as rules of thumb, or as ideals to be borne in mind in practice, rather than 
as iron requirements.  
Note, too, that we are not suggesting that the problems outlined in the above have 
led to concrete errors in the annotations of genes by third parties, for example in the 
construction of model organism databases. We hypothesize that the biologists who are 
responsible for such annotations are able to use their biological expertise in order to 
block the faulty inferences which would otherwise result. To the extent, however, that 
GO is pressed into service as a reference-platform for the automatic navigation 
between biomedical databases, then the issue of consistency with standard principles 
of classification and definition will come to be of increasing importance. 
Some of the mentioned problems can be overcome via relatively minor modifica-
tions to DAG-Edit, which would have a significant impact on the design and reliabil-
ity of GO’s ontologies since they would sharpen the awareness of designers and users 
in ways which can lead both to the avoidance of common pitfalls in the course of 
curation and to an ontologically more coherent structuring of the resultant data. The 
advantage in incorporating these changes into DAG-Edit would be also that it would 
not require that GO and the other OBO ontologies be rebuilt from scratch: actual and 
potential inconsistencies would be highlighted, and can be corrected on the fly.  
Multiple inheritance, to repeat, is a particularly important cause of problems in the 
guise of both coding errors and obstacles to the coherent alignment of ontologies that 
will be needed in the future. This is because the success of such alignment depends 
crucially on the degree to which the basic ontological relations – above all relations 
such as is a and part of – can be relied on as having the same meanings in the 
different ontologies to be aligned. Cases of multiple inheritance go hand in hand, at 
least in many cases, with the assignment to the is a relation of a plurality of different 
meanings within a single ontology. The resultant mélange makes coherent integration 
across ontologies achievable (at best) only under the guidance of human beings with 
the sorts of biological knowledge which can override the mismatches which otherwise 
threaten to arise. This, however, is to defeat the very purpose of constructing 
bioinformatics ontologies as the basis for a new kind of biological and biomedical 
research designed to exploit the power of computers. 
As Ogren et al. [25] have pointed out, almost two-thirds of all GO terms contain 
other GO terms as substrings, the including term being in many cases derived from 
the included term via operators such as ‘regulation of ’ or ‘sensu’. Many of the latter 
recur consistently in certain kinds of subtrees of GO’s three ontologies, and in ways 
which reflect ontologically significant relations between the corresponding classes. 
Ogren et al. propose that the presence of these operators be exploited ‘to make the 
information in GO more computationally accessible, to construct a conceptually 
richer representation of the data encoded in the ontology, and to assist in the analysis 
of natural language texts.’ We suggest taking this proposal still further by building the 
corresponding machinery for enforcing compositionality into the DAG-Edit tool and 
by exploiting analogous compositionality of information on the side of GO’s 
definitions. Such proposals will, however, bear fruit only to the extent that GO’s 
classifications and definitions satisfy the formal principles set forth above. 
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